Consider a substitution instance of (LP):

(*) It is unjust or unfair of an employer to favor job applicant A with employment over job applicant B, if his basis for doing so is irrelevant to the work to be done (e.g., A is white; B is African American).

(*) is true–and obviously so. For here, quite clearly, the basis of the decision isn’t work-relevant; it follows, on (*), that the employer has acted unjustly or unfairly.

But now suppose, adapting your comments to the case at hand, someone were to object as follows:

“However, this inference goes through only if the employer’s treatment of A/B is an instance of the general claim (LP). And since (LP) is in terms of some individual being treated *morally better* than another, you can get the inference you want only if this employer’s treatment of A (the white applicant) is morally better than that shown to B (the African American applicant).”

Well, you can see straight away that the argument is logically invalid. To say that (*) is true in *no way* requires you to say that hiring the white applicant is morally better than hiring the African American applicant. Like us, you no doubt happily assent to (*). But you would surely think it an odd (if not incomprehensible) request, if we went on to demand that you provide good reasons for why (in this case) it’s morally better to hire the white applicant.

Your reply should be that this moral superiority claim doesn’t logically follow from (*). You should go still further, however, insisting that you can’t be held responsible for providing reasons for the false entailments of the things you believe. In our view, nothing could be more reasonable on your part.

The application to your defense of AntiHume’s argument is patent.

AntiHume pointed out that if ‘favor’ in LP merely means “treats differently,” without the moral difference, then LP is false. So, ‘favor’ in your LP must mean something like “treats morally better.”

Keeping this in mind, let’s move now to the second horn of your deontic dilemma, where we’re supposing that God has a basis for his treating the elect differently than the non-elect. What you want to show here is that God’s treatment of the elect is unjust or unfair. The way you try to show this is by pointing out that God’s basis here would not be C-relevant, and so it follows that God is unjust/unfair. However, this inference goes through only if God’s treatment of the elect/non-elect is an instance of the general claim LP. And since LP is in terms of some group being treated *morally better* than another, you can get the inference you want only if God’s treatment of the elect is morally better than that shown to the non-elect.

But nowhere (that I can see) do you give us any reason to think that God’s treatment of the elect is morally better than that shown to the non-elect. So why should we think that you can use LP to get the inference you want? Why think God’s treatment here is an instance of LP?

And I think you need to give us these reasons. For no Calvinist thinks that God treats one group morally better than the other. As things stand, for your dilemma to succeed, you must assume something that your opponent denies. So unless you have some good reasons for Calvinists to think that God’s treatment of the elect is morally better than his treatment of the non-elect, it’s hard to see how the argument can be persuasive.

If the worry is that (LP) entails (or requires) a moral superiority claim, then that claim would be grounded in whatever grounds (LP).

Thanks,

Tom

1) God must damn everyone. The Bible says he will not.
2) God must save everyone. The Bible says he will not.
3) God must save people according to some “contextually relevant” condition that they meet. But this would seem to suggest that people are required to merit salvation. In that case, salvation would not be of grace.

Ergo, there must be something wrong with your analysis.

“For God does not treat the elect morally better than the non-elect, even if the basis for his treatment is context irrelevant. God’s saving of the elect is morally good, and his damnation of the non-elect is morally good. I see no reason to think that either treatment is morally better than the other.”

It’s interesting how you set up the problem here. You pose it not in terms of God’s bestowing or withholding irresistible grace, but rather his saving the elect and damning the non-elect. So you want to affirm two things:

(1) God’s saving the elect is good
and
(2) God’s damning the non-elect is good.

But on Calvinism, (1) is equivalent to

(1*) God’s bestowing irresistible grace on the elect is good,

while (2) is equivalent to

(2*) God’s withholding irresistible grace from the non-elect is good.

Now if whatever is ‘good’ is also ‘morally permissible’–a safe enough assumption–then (1*) and (2*) respectively entail

(1**) It is permissible that God bestows irresistible grace on the elect
and
(2**) It is permissible that God withholds irresistible grace from the non-elect.

Hence you’re committed to the truth of both. But so are we; indeed, we said as much in our post. So we’re all agreed. Here’s the difference. We don’t accept this invalid inference: that from (1**) and (2**) we can infer

(3) It is permissible that (God bestows irresistible grace on the elect & God withholds irresistible grace from the non-elect).

The logical form of this argument isn’t valid–deontically. (Actually, we think you’d agree.) But then our point would simply be this. Your claim that “God does not treat the elect morally better than the non-elect” is true only if (3) is true. But you’re not entitled to (3)–at least not based on anything you’ve said so far.

It’s simply wonderful objection though, AntiHume. Many thanks for pressing it!!

“It is unjust or unfair to favor A over B in context C, if your basis for doing so is C-irrelevant.”

But this seems ambiguous between at least two readings of ‘favor’, and resolving the ambiguity either way seems to make the argument unsound.

One, by ‘favor’ here you might mean merely ‘treat differently’. But then the principle is clearly false. It’s not unfair for me to give one of my sisters a different birthday gift than I give to the other on her birthday, even though my basis for one gift is that I know my sister will like it, and the basis for the other is that I know the gift will be good for my sister, even though I know she won’t like it. These bases are not “C-relevant” to the context of my giving them gifts, since that context is that it is their birthday. So on this disambiguation, the antecedent of LP can be true while the consequent is false. It is a false general principle.

Two, by ‘favor’ you might mean ‘treats morally better’. But then God’s deciding among the elect and non-elect isn’t an instance of the consequent of LP. For God does not treat the elect morally better than the non-elect, even if the basis for his treatment is context irrelevant. God’s saving of the elect is morally good, and his damnation of the non-elect is morally good. I see no reason to think that either treatment is morally better than the other. The interesting differences between God’s treatment of these two groups are not in terms of differences of moral goodness.

So your conclusion–that, given Calvinism, God treats the elect and non-elect unfairly/justly–doesn’t follow.

So using the Lev. Principle form we would get:

It is just or fair to favor 11th hour worker over early AM worker in work/wages context if your basis for doing so is work/wages-relevant.

Since this is a work/wages relevant context it meets the test as being fair. That is no reason given for paying some workers more than others that is outside of that context (gender, race, status, etc).

I guess the real question is were the 11th hour workers favored over the AM workers?

And even if we consider that they were favored (because they were paid more per hour) we have to note that those complaining were paid the agreed upon wage. The rest of the workers were paid what the master deemed was “right”. The master was fair and just to all of the workers in that each was paid according to the agreement made with each of them in a work/wages context. The only “unfair” charge that can brought against the master might be that he favored later hires than earlier hires by offering them a better deal. But all that means is that the workers can try to strike a better deal the next day.

As an IT professional there was a time when employers hired skilled people at salary X. But when the Internet bubble started the same skills and job paid a lot more. The earlier employees could complain this is unfair (making less for same work), but they are being paid what they agreed to do the job for. The real options are ask for more pay for the future work or find someone willing to pay more for the same work.

Another observations on the parable as it relates to efficacious grace. The master fairly and generously gave all those needing work an opportunity to work for pay. No unfair hiring practices. No offer to work only to some. And the workers received both a sincere offer to work from the master and were able to engage in the work.

Lastly, there is a reason that this parable is given. It is explaining the kingdom using this as an illustration. I think a reasonable interpretation is that the kingdom is being offered to those who are Jewish and to those who are not (ie Samaritins and Gentiles (the last)). All will receive the kingdom on the same condition – faith. As I think about it an loose application to this might be applied to those who receive the kingdom but suffer more for their faith than others.

Thanks and have a good w/e
Mike